The balance of hardships is presumed to favor possession by petitioner unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, showing that the hardships to respondent substantially outweigh the hardships to petitioner and any minor child or dependent adult in petitioner's care. The court, on the request of petitioner or on its own motion, may order respondent to provide suitable, accessible, alternate housing for petitioner instead of excluding respondent from a mutual residence or household.5

Where there is on file a verified complaint or verified petition seeking temporary eviction from the marital residence, the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding, only in cases where the physical or mental well being of either spouse or their children is jeopardized by occupancy of the marital residence by both spouses, and only upon due notice and full hearing, unless waived by the court on good cause shown, enter orders of injunction, mandatory or restraining, granting the exclusive possession of the marital residence to either spouse, by eviction from, or restoration of, the marital residence, until the final determination of the cause.7

Unless the court finds the occurrence of ongoing abuse as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, the court shall presume that the maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical, mental, moral, and emotional well-being of their child is in the best interest of the child. There shall be no presumption in favor of or against joint custody.15

A trial court must hold a hearing on the issue of restricted visitation and should grant restricted visitation only after making the extraordinary finding that visitation would seriously endanger the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. The serious endangerment standard contained in section 607© of the Act is "onerous, stringent, and rigorous" to meet because liberal visitation is the rule and restricted visitation is the exception.22

The Illinois courts have held that where the proceeding is by a custodial parent to restrict or deny the visitation, the burden is upon the custodial parent to prove by a preponderance that the visitation then provided endangers the welfare of the children. (Cite). However, where the non-custodial parent seeks to modify visitation rights which have been originally granted in the dissolution decree, the burden of proof is upon such parent to show that the modification is in the "best interest" of the child or children.24

We do not read Hazelwonder27 as circumscribing a court's power to restrict visitation through an order of protection until such time as the child or children are directly harmed. (Cite). We reject any claim that evidence of abuse of the custodial spouse is an insufficient basis to support an order prohibiting unauthorized contact and potential abuse of the children in the custodian's care. The scope of the Act provides broad categories of abuse and prohibited conduct sufficient to impose an order of protection. (See 750 ILCS 60/214 (West Supp 1993).) Once one member of a household is abused, the court has maximum discretionary power to fashion the scope of an order of protection to include other household members or relatives who may be at risk of retaliatory acts by the abuser.28

As already stated, the final decision on custody was a result of concern for the stability and continuity of the children's lives, and it would not have served their best interests for the court to have ignored the fact that they had been residing with their mother and step-father in Champaign for well over two years. It must be accepted that their residence in Champaign for that time was the result of the decision on temporary custody and the delay caused by the appeal. However, all factors which relate to the best interests of the children should be considered by the court. Contrary to the dire warnings of consequences if the court's decision is upheld, we perceive no basis for concluding, on the record in this case, that our decision will unfairly advantage the parent who first obtains custody in the determination of the best interests of the children.31

(t)he Domestic Violence Act is not the appropriate vehicle for resolving such issues. We note that the order of protection did not restrict Ross's visitation or contact with Laine. The court narrowly drafted the order to prohibit physical abuse, harassment, interference with personal liberty or intimidation. Nevertheless, based on this record, we believe that Kathryn misused the Domestic Violence Act for the purpose of attempting to alter Ross's visitation with Laine. For that reason, and because we find that no harassment occurred, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and vacate the order of protection.35

Robert has not advanced any reason, nor can we find one, to justify his proceeding under the Domestic Violence Act rather than the Marriage Act. Whatever the relief he sought - extended visitation, injunction or custody - he could have received under section 610 of the Marriage Act. To approve the procedure followed in this case would be an open invitation to parties disappointed in a custody dispute to file a separate action under the Domestic Violence Act and call it something other than a claim for custody.37